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Sea-level Change
Foreword
By Professor Vincent Courtillot
Emeritus professor of geophysics, Paris Diderot University
Sea level change is a naturally occurring process. Since the last glacial maximum, some
18,000 years ago, de-glaciation has taken place and this natural global warming has
led to sea-level rise of on average 120 m or so. At some times, pulses of melt water
coming from large peri-glacial lakes led to rates of sea-level rise as high as 3 m per
century. The rate slowed down some 7000 years ago and since then has been naturally
fluctuating by only a few meters. The remaining global sea-level rise has been about
20 cm in the 20th century. Has this led to global disasters? The answer is no. If the
projected rise over the 21st century is double what was seen in the 20th, is it likely that
it will result in global disasters? Again, the answer is most likely no; human ingenuity,
innovation and engineering, and the proper material and financial resources should
solve local problems if and when they arrive, as they have in the 20th century (see the
Dutch example).
In this short and accessible monograph, Willem de Lange and Robert Carter de-
scribe and explain sea-level change, including the many remaining uncertainties in
our full understanding of what exactly drives this change, and discuss the implications,
mainly regarding coastal management. Themonograph is intended for policy makers,
but it should be informative for any educated reader. De Lange and Carter analyse the
causes of sea-level change, and describe how it has beenmeasured – with tide gauges
over the past 100 to 150 years and from satellites over the past 30 years. Their keymes-
sage is to recall that sea-level change is a local phenomenon, with high variability and
multiple causes. In the 20th century, for a global average rise of 20 cm, there has been
sea-level rise of up to twice that value in some places, but in others a drop of the same
amount! Because of themeltingof a large former ice capover the Baltic area, the Earth’s
viscous mantle is slowly deforming and as a result sea-level is decreasing in the North
of the British Isles at the same time as it is rising on the south coast. Moreover, we have
known since Darwin and understood since the plate tectonics revolution that atolls
in the Pacific form over slowly subsiding volcanoes and will eventually drown (but at
a slower ‘geological’ rate, due to thermal subsidence of the lithosphere on which they
stand). In any case, the global average has no practical value in local or regional coastal
management.
And the global average rates are debated. The rate indicated by tide gauges over
a 100 year period is about 2 mm per year; but the rate indicated by satellites over the
past 30 years is about 3 mm per year. Is this apparent acceleration real? It is always
slightly worrying to see a change in rate at the time of amajor change inmeasurement
method. If one looks carefully at the various curves, one finds that sea-level varies on
many time scales, from a few years to a century and probably much more. Measured
over only a decade, the rate changes. The recent apparent acceleration may simply be
part of a shorter oscillation linked to decadal and multi-decadal changes in the Pacific
and North Atlantic oscillations. In that case, the average over 100 years is more sig-
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nificant than that over a few recent decades: the ‘least unreasonable’ forecast for the
21st century would be the same value as in the 20th century: a rise of 20 cm. This is
actually, as recalled by de Lange and Carter, at the lower end of the range of the IPCC’s
forecasts. And, as suggested above, even a rate twice as fast would be unlikely to lead
to unmanageable global disasters. If a correlation with global temperature curves is
sought (global temperatures raise at least as many questions as sea-level: the rise over
the past 100 years is very likely but very small, fluctuations occur on decadal to multi-
decadal time scales and there is an apparent plateau or standstill since themid 1990s),
the recent plateau might suggest that sea-level rise will slow down. The question is
the unknown time-delay between temperature change and ice-melting, deeper ocean
water warming or ocean thermal expansion. The occurrence of a succession of 30-year
periods of successively slower and faster warming (hence the existence of a 60 year pe-
riodicity of as yet unknown origin – possibly due to changes in solar activity or position
due to gravitational effects from Jupiter and Saturn) would lead to the (empirical) fore-
cast of no temperature change and slower sea-level change over the next one or two
decades. After that who knows? The average warming of the 20th century could be
extrapolated, but no prediction beyond, say, a decade is reasonably certain. A recent
paper by my colleague Anny Cazenave and co-authors (Nature Climate Change, 2014)
finds that:
Since the early 1990s, sea level rose at a mean rate of ~3.1 mm yr−1. However,
over the last decade a slowdown of this rate, of about 30%, has been recorded. It
coincides with a plateau in Earth’s mean surface temperature evolution, known as
the recent pause in warming.
Although the authors interpret this otherwise (Anny Cazenave knows we disagree
on this), one may propose that the simplest conclusion is that indeed decadal fluctu-
ations occur and that this recent deceleration cancels the previous acceleration and
confirms that the mean rate over the 20th century still applies. But this discussion of
global data, as emphasized by de Lange and Carter, may not be of much practical use,
as they clearly show that ‘for environmental management purposes sea-level change
should be assessed at local to regional scales, and not globally’. They conclude that
‘The one certainty is that future sea-level will continue to change at differing rates and
in different directions at locations around the world, as it always has in the past’.
De Lange and Carter finally discuss the interesting practical policy example of the
Thames Estuary 2100 Plan, which they suggest is as ‘an excellent template for appli-
cation’. In order to suggest what the best policy outcome may be, they underline the
large uncertainty in our understanding of such complex natural processes and as a re-
sult in any forecast. They rightly point out the absurdity of following the (hard version
of the) precautionary principle and conclude that ‘the appropriate policy should be
one of careful preparation for, and adaptation to, hazardous events as and when they
occur’. This is also true for earthquakes, tsunamis or volcanic eruptions, i.e. most nat-
ural hazards. As a French citizen, I remain appalled that this principle was introduced
in our Constitution! Whereas the concepts of precaution should be taught at a young
age in both family and schools, I do not see how a constitutional judge would find ra-
tional bases for deciding that someone failed to follow the principle in all cases of ‘lack
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of full scientific certainty’. The final recommendations of de Lange and Carter are inmy
view scientifically sound and based on common good sense, which can be as secure as
trusting too much the outputs of huge, complex, uncertain computer models.
Vincent Courtillot
Paris, March 2014
Professor Vincent Courtillot is Emeritus Professor of Geophysics at the Paris Diderot Univer-
sity, a fellow of the RAS, AGU and EGU and amember of the Paris Academy of Sciences.
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Summary
1. Global sea-level corresponds to a notional world-wide average and is determined
by the interaction between the volume of the ocean basins, the volume of water
that they contain and the effect of Earth’s gravitational field.
2. Change in global sea-level is caused by:
• a change in ocean basin volume, controlled by geological forces
• a change in seawater density, resulting from variations in ocean temperature
or salinity;
• the addition or subtraction of water from the ocean by the melting and freez-
ing of glaciers and ice-caps.
Global sea-level is estimated using averaged measurements from a worldwide net-
work of coastal tide-gauges or from satellite-borne instruments. Because they rep-
resent a worldwide average, neither of these figures has any useful application to
coastal management in specific locations. Instead, a knowledge of local relative
sea-level change, as measured at specific coastal locations, is the basis for practi-
cal coastal management. Local sea-levels are rising or falling in different parts of the
world, depending upon the direction and rate of movement of the underlying land
(tectonic change).
3. Sea-level change ismainly a coastalmanagement issue, but the position of sea-level
is only one of several important factors that controls the position and changes in
the disposition of the shoreline. Other important forces and controls that have to
be considered include:
• the rise or fall of the land
• the supply of sediment
• the weather and climate (short and long-term temperature, wind, rainfall)
• the oceans (waves, tides, storms, tsunami)
• erosion and gravitational collapse (for cliffed shorelines).
4. In its natural state, a sedimentary shorelinemay shift landwards or seawards byme-
tres to many tens of metres over periods between days and decades. In the past,
coastal inhabitants have adapted to such changes, and trying to prevent them by
controlling the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is neither practical nor
cost-effective.
5. Coral atolls depend upon the interaction of a shallow ocean seafloor (generally the
top of a submerging volcano), the growth and erosion of a coral reef, and the nat-
ural forces of winds, waves and tides. The integrity of an atoll is constantly under
threat from entirely natural erosive forces. On top of this, human activities such as
sand mining, construction project loading and groundwater withdrawal all cause
local lowering of the ground surface, and thereby encourage marine incursion. It
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is this human interference, in combination with episodic natural hazards like tides
and storms, and not global sea-level change that provides the alarming footage of
marine flooding on atolls that from time to time appears on television news screens.
6. Changes in sea-level over long periods of time (millions of years) are inferred from
geological evidence. These long-term changes suggest that any sea-level rises in
response to temperature increasesdecelerate rather thanaccelerateover time. Such
changes also indicate amaximum rate anddurationof natural sea-level rise of about
30 mm/y over periods of a century or so.
7. Basedon thesegeological studies, it appears that slow global sea-level rise – typically
less than10mm/y–hasbeen takingplaceover the last 10,000 y. At specific localities,
this rising trend interacts with changing land levels due to a range of geological
processes and multi-decadal climatic oscillations to produce different patterns of
local relative sea-level change throughout theworld – in someplaces rising, in others
static and in others falling.
8. The long-term tide-gauge data record a 20th century average global sea-level rise
of about +1–2 mm/y. It is established by many studies, too, that over the last 150
years global sea-level has been rising at an average rate of about 1.8mm/y, which is
inferred to represent the slow continuation of amelting of the ice sheets that began
about 17,000 years ago.
9. Based on the same records, the IPCC has estimated an average rate of global rise
between 1900 and 2000 of 1.6 mm/y (2007; 4th Assessment Report) or between
1901 and 2010 of 1.7±0.2mm/y (2013; 5th Assessment Report). This global average
ignores both short-term and multi-decadal changes in sea-level that are known to
beassociatedwithmeteorological andoceanographicoscillations, and the local and
regional effects of landmovement. These additional factors are likely to continue to
be important for future sea levels, and so should be considered in conjunction with
projections of global sea level. Thedominanceof suchprocesses in sea-level change
means that for environmental management purposes sea-level changes should be
assessed at local to regional scales, and not globally.
10. Satellitemeasurements of global sea-level have only been available since 1992, and
the technology is therefore in its infancy. Complex computation and statistical anal-
ysis is required to transform raw satellite measurements into a sea-level curve, in-
cluding the correction and piecing together of records collected over many years
by ageing, and ultimately different, satellite vehicles. In recent years, it has been
claimed on the basis of satellite measurements that the rate of sea-level rise since
1992 is greater than 3 mm/y – twice that measured using tide-gauge data for ear-
lier periods, although the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report considers it likely that simi-
lar rates occurred between 1930 and 1950. This apples-to-oranges comparison has
formed the basis of claims that the rate of rise is accelerating, as required by the
global warming hypothesis.
11. Most policy discussions regarding sea-level change are conducted in terms of com-
putermodelledprojections, rather thanof factual information. In its 4thAssessment
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Report in 2007, the IPCC used physics-based computer simulations of the Earth and
its climate toproject a riseof sea-level of between18and59cmby2100. Thebottom
endof this range correspondswith the 18-cm rise in sea-level predictedby empirical
models and matches the long-term tide-gauge rate of rise of 1.8 mm/y.
12. Semi-empirical models produce the highest and most alarming estimates of rates
of future sea-level change so far published (between 0.8 and 1.8m by 2100). Strong
controversy exists over the likely accuracy and policy usefulness of these results.
Given that both empirical and deterministic modelling yield more modest projec-
tions of future sea-level, the semi-empirical models can at best only be viewed as a
work in progress.
13. The IPCC estimates that 1.1 mm of the 20th century sea-level rise of 1.8 mm/y can
be accounted for by the combined effects of continuing ice melt (~0.7 mm/y) and
ocean expansion due to warming (~0.4 mm/y), with the remaining ~0.7 mm/y re-
lating to dynamic oceanographic and meteorological factors. The relatively small
contribution from melt water indicates that there is no scientific basis for the claim
that global warming will imminently melt so much ice that sea levels will rise dra-
matically; by 20 ft in the imagination of Al Gore (Gore, 2006) or by 5m in that of Jim
Hansen (Hansen, 2007; Hansen and Sato, 2012).
Conclusions
Currentglobal sea-level policy, supportedbymanygovernments, is to reduce thequan-
tity of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere in order to slow a global warming that is ap-
parently no longer happening, in a vain attempt to reduce the rate of global sea-level
rise. This policy attempts tomoderate a theoretical environmental variable, ignores lo-
cal sea-level and coastal management realities, is ineffectual in significantly reducing
sea-level rise and is not cost effective compared to incremental adaptation.
Global sea-level policy as currently practiced by governments is therefore scientifi-
cally uncertain and both financially and politically unsustainable.
Policy recommendations
Based on the material presented in this paper we recommend the implementation of
three policy guidelines.
• Abandonment of ‘let’s stop global sea-level rise’ policies: No justification exists for
continuing to base sea-level policy and coastal management regulation upon the
outcomes of speculative deterministic or semi-empirical sea-level modelling. Even
were the rate of global sea-level change able to be known accurately, the practice of
using a notional global rate of change to manage specific coastal locations world-
wide is irrational, and should be abandoned.
• Recognition of the local or regional nature of coastal hazard: Most coastal hazard
is intrinsically local in nature. Other than periodic tsunami and exceptional storms,
it is the regular and repetitive local processes of wind, waves, tides and sediment
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supply that fashion the location and shape of the shorelines of the world. Yes, local
relative sea-level is an important determinant, but in some localities that is rising and
in others falling. Accordingly, there is no ‘one size fits all’ sea-level curve or policy
that can be applied. Crucially, coastal hazard needs to bemanaged in the context of
regional and local knowledge, using data gathered by site-specific tide-gauges and
other relevant instrumentation.
• Use of planning controls that are flexible and adaptive in nature: Many planning reg-
ulations already recognize the dynamic nature of shorelines, for example by apply-
ing minimum building setback distances or heights from the tidemark. In addition,
engineering solutions (groynes, breakwaters, sea-defence walls) are often used in
attempts to stabilize a shoreline. To the degree that they are both effective and envi-
ronmentally acceptable, such solutions should be encouraged. Nevertheless, occa-
sional damagewill continue tobe imposed fromtime to timeby large stormsorother
unusual natural events, and that no matter how excellent the pre-existing coastal
engineering and planning controls may be. In these circumstances, the appropriate
policy should be one of careful preparation for, and adaptation to, hazardous events
as and when they occur.
It is the height of folly, andwaste ofmoney, to attempt to ‘control’ the size or frequency
of damaging natural events by expecting that reductions in human carbon dioxide
emissions will moderate climate ‘favourably’ – whether that be putatively sought from
amoderation in the frequency and intensity of damaging natural events or by a reduc-
tion in the rate of global average sea-level rise itself.
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1 Introduction
Sea-level rise is one of themost feared impacts of any future global warming (Nicholls,
2011), but public discussion of the problem is beset by poor data, misleading analy-
sis and an over-reliance on computer model projections. This has led to unnecessary
alarm.
A proper understanding of the risks associated with sea-level change can only be
attained by maintaining a clear distinction between global (or eustatic) sea-level and
local relative sea-level. Sea-level changes are measured against a reference level (the
geoid1) that is difficult to define over regional and global scales, because contrary to
popular belief the Earth’s surface is not static.
This briefing paper provides a summary of these complex issues at a level suitable
for policymakers. A fuller andmore technical explanation is provided by de Lange and
Carter (2013).
Global sea-level change
Global sea-level change is measured relative to an idealised reference level, and is a
function of the volume of the ocean basins and the volume of water that they contain.
Global changes are brought about by three main mechanisms:
• changes in ocean basin volume caused by tectonic and sedimentary processes
• changes in seawater density caused by variations in ocean temperature or salin-
ity
• changes in the volume of water caused by themelting or freezing of glaciers and
ice-caps
Ocean basin volume changes occur too slowly to be significant over human lifetimes
and it is therefore the other twomechanisms that drive contemporary concerns about
sea-level rise.
Warming temperature in itself is only aminor factor contributing to global sea-level
rise, because seawater has a relatively small coefficient of expansion and because, over
the timescales of interest, any warming is largely confined to the upper few hundred
metres of the ocean surface.
The melting of land ice – including both mountain glaciers and the ice sheets of
Greenland and Antarctica – is a more significant driver of global sea-level rise. For ex-
ample, during the glacial–interglacial climatic cycling over the last half-million years,
glacial sea-levels were about 120 m lower than the modern shoreline (e.g. Lambeck
and Nakada, 1990). Moreover, during themost recent interglacial, about 120,000 years
ago, global temperature was warmer than today as a result of enhanced seasonality,
and significant extra parts of the Greenland ice sheetmelted. As a consequence, global
1 The geoid is defined as the equipotential surface of the Earth’s gravity field which best fits, in a least squares sense,
globalmean sea level (http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/GEOID/geoid_def.html). This illustrates oneof thedifficultieswith
measuring global sea level changes, which is that the reference level is in itself a function of the parameter being
measured.
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sea-level was several metres higher than today (see e.g. Murray Wallace and Belperio,
1991).
As explained in more detail in Section 3, tide-gauge measurements indicate that
global sea-level has been rising at a rate of about 1.8 mm/y for the last 100 years,2
whereas the shorter satellite record suggests a rise of more than 3 mm/y. However,
a recent reanalysis of the satellite data, alongside the possible contributions from re-
cent warming and ice-melt estimates, has given a rise of 1.3±0.9 mm/y for 2005–2011,
which is more consistent with the tide-gauge measurements (Leuliette, 2012).
Around the world, significant regional variations occur in the rate and direction of
sea-level change; while some regions of the world’s oceans are today rising faster than
hitherto, in other regions sea-level fall is occurring. In part this is due to variations in the
rate of warming and salinity changes between different regions, and proximity to dis-
chargesofmeltwater. Mostly it reflects the influenceofmajor oceancirculation systems
that redistribute heat and mass through the oceans. The upshot of these processes is
that at any location around or within the oceans, the observed sea-level behaviour can
differ significantly from the smoothedglobal average. Furthermore,whenattempts are
made to estimate global sea-level from studies at specific locations, it is found to con-
stantly vary through time. For example a recent study in the Kattegat Sea estimates
that, after correction for local tectonic and other effects, rates of ‘eustatic’ sea-level
change since 5,000 years ago have varied through time by between −3.1 mm/y and
+3.7 mm/y (Hansen, 2014).
Conclusion
Because they represent a worldwide average, neither the tide-gauge nor the satellite
estimates of global sea-level have any useful application per se to coastalmanagement
in specific locations.
Local sea-level change
Local relative sea-level ismeasured at specific coastal locations. Themeasurements are
therefore affected by the local movement up or down of the land as well as by the no-
tional global sea-level. Local sea-level change therefore occurs at greatly different rates
and directions at different locations (Figure 1). In some locations the land is rising: for
example, places that were depressed under theweight of the ice caps 20,000 years ago
started to rise again as the icemelted.3 In consequence, in Scandinavia for example, the
land is rising at rates of up to 9 mm/year, and local relative sea-level is therefore now
falling through time despite the concurrent slow long-term rise in global sea-level.
2Credible estimates of this value range between about 1.0 and 2.0 mm/y. For the purposes of this paper we have
accepted the estimate in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (2001), which is that 20th century sea-level rise oc-
curred at a rate of 1.8 mm/y, partitioned as 0.4 mm/y for thermal expansion, 0.7 mm/y for ice melt and 0.7 mm/y
for dynamic oceanographic factors.
3 The process is called isostasy, and is caused by slow adjustment flowage at depth in response to the addition or
removal of loads at the Earth’s surface. The compensating flows occur in a hot, semi-plastic layer of themantle (the
athenosphere) at depths of 70–250 km, just below Earth’s rigid outer shell (lithosphere).
12
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Figure 1: Local relative sea-level curves for the last 6000 years, modelled to include
hydro-isostatic and glacio-isostatic effects combined with an idealised eustatic curve
(after Clark and Lingle, 1979). Note the widely varying patterns of sea-level change at
different places around the world, caused by deep-seated plastic flow in response to
changing surface loads of ice and water.
Conversely, at locationsdistant frompolar ice caps, such asAustralia, no suchglacial
rebound is occurring, which results in local sea-level change inmany places being sim-
ilar to the global average rate of rise. Therefore, at many but not all locations around
the Australian coast, sea-level has risen over the last century at rates between about 1
and 2 mm/y, with an absolute range between −6.9 mm/y and +4.3 mm/y.
Conclusion
Local relative sea-level change is what counts for purposes of coastal planning, and
this is highly variable worldwide depending upon the differing rates at which the land
is uplifting or subsiding.
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Public confusion about sea-level change
In general, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and govern-
ment planning andmanagement authorities, use the unqualified and ambiguous term
‘sea-level’ when discussing this issue. In nearly all instances, this usage refers to global
average sea-level.
This leads to great confusion in the public mind. First, because most people think
that when government scientists or ministers talk about sea-level change they are re-
ferring to what is actually happening on the nearest coastline rather than discussing
a global statistic. Second, and after people have had the distinction between local
and global sea-level explained to them, they are (rightly) puzzled as to why a planning
agency would use a notional global average value rather than direct measurements
made at nearby coastal locations of interest. After all, houses do not have their heating
and air-conditioning designed to copewith the global average temperature range, but
with the known (andmeasured) local temperature range; why should coastal planning
and sea-level matters be any different?
Conclusion
On its own, a knowledge of global sea-level behaviour does not enable the determina-
tion of likely future shoreline positions; it is therefore of little value for coastal manage-
ment and environmental protection purposes.
2 Coastal processes
It is not recognisedwidely that, as a potentially hazardous environmental variable, sea-
level change bears almost exclusively on the issue of coastal management: outside of
very shallow coastal water, whether the sea-level is higher or lower is of no practical
concern. Thus at the heart of the issue of sea-level policy lies the need for an under-
standing of coastal processes.
The position of a shoreline and the stability of that position depend upon a number
of factors. One of these is indeed local mean sea-level, but several other important
processes also operate within and upon the coastal environment - some natural and
some influenced by human development.
What controls the position of a low-lying continental shoreline?
As well as rebound from the last ice age and tectonic changes, other factors may also
cause vertical displacement of the land surface, including consolidation, compaction
and liquefaction of sub-surface sedimentary layers, intrusion of molten rock – magma
– into underlying strata, and the extraction of oil, gas orwater. Someof these processes
are relatively constant, while others only occur episodically.
Along shorelines made up of easily moved and transported gravel, sand and mud,
the wind, waves and tides cause the movement of shorelines. It is increasingly recog-
nised that there are interannual and decadal scale fluctuations in the frequency and
14
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Figure 2: Geography of eastern Kent. Left: As it was between the first and fifteenth
centuries. Right: As it is today.
magnitude of storms, which means that there are several time scales over which mo-
bile shorelines can advance and retreat in response to storms. This implies that it is not
advisable to use short-term records to assess coastal responses to sea-level rise and
changing climate.
Another factor that affects the position of a shoreline is variation in the sediment
supply. Over time, the provision or loss of sediment can exercise a dramatic influence
on the location of the shoreline. For example, the delta of the Indus River has expanded
noticeably in recent decades because of increased sediment supply.
A well-known example of quite dramatic change in shoreline over a short period of
time concerns the geography of eastern Kent, U.K. (see Figure 2; Robinson and Cloet,
1953; Perkins, 2007). Between Roman times and about 1400 AD, the Thanet regionwas
an island, fully separated from the English mainland. A port existed at Fordwich, near
Canterbury. Thereafter, the shallow seaway that separated the Isle of Thanet disap-
peared consequent upon gentle uplift (Teferle et al. 2006), which involved both long-
term tectonic uplift and interglacial isostatic subsidence (Waller and Long, 2003). Sedi-
ment infill resulted in the former islandbecomingan integral part of theKentmainland.
What was formerly seabed is today farmland or towns, andmany of the former ports of
the region are now located well inland. Because the historic pattern of global sea-level
change is a slow and declining rise (cf. Figure 3), and given that the land has also been
rising slowly, local relative sea-level is unlikely to have changedmuch over the last 500
years (So, 1965), and the change in geography probably results largely from sedimen-
tary infill of the former seaway. The message is that high rates of sea-level change are
not a necessary accompaniment to significant coastal and shoreline change.
Importantly, all such shoreline changes are site specific, and different changesmay
occur over quite short distances of a kilometre or two. For instance a recent study of
Holocene marine highstand shoreline deposits in Brazil by Hein et al. (2014) demon-
strated ‘the nonlinearity of coastal response to sea-level change, and the site speci-
ficity of conditions associatedwith the formation of each highstand deposit type, even
within a single small embayment, demonstrates the non-uniformity of that response’.
Inmany places in theworld, appropriate responses to shoreline change and chang-
ing sea-level have been made by use of local engineering works. For example, beach
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stability has been encouraged by the introduction of groynes to entrap sand, and the
buildingof seawalls andprotectivedykeshas combated sea-level rise. In applying such
measures, the Dutch and others have sensibly based their coastal engineering plans
on scientific knowledge of locally observed rates of shoreline and sea-level change
(Bakker, 2013).
Cliffs are constantly attacked and eroded by marine processes. On exposed coasts
with high rates of erosion, long term landward retreat of the cliff edge may occur at
rates of 1 m/y or higher. As many residents of the eastern UK know, for houses located
near to an eroding modern cliff edge it is therefore usually a matter of when, rather
than if, cliff and house collapse occurs. Unlike soft sediment shorelines, cliffs do not
recover after an erosion event.
Conclusion
Shorelines are dynamic geographic features. The average position of a sedimentary
shoreline may shift landwards or seawards by distances of metres to many tens of me-
tres over periods between days and years, in response to variations in the amount of
sediment supply, the occurrence of calms and major storms, and variations in local
mean sea-level. In the past, coastal inhabitants have adapted to such changes.
What about coral atolls?
Relentless media attention has ensured that the alleged threat to coral atolls from sea-
level rise remains in the public eye, with the Tuvalu Islands receiving themost publicity.
The origin of coral atolls was famously first explainedbyCharles Darwin, whonoted
that they were reef sandbank complexes situated on top of sinking, extinct volcanos.
Such atolls are made up of detrital coral sand that has been eroded from the living
reef communities that develop as a volcano submerges andwhich is washed into shal-
low banks. Subsequently, some of these sand banks develop a small freshwater lens,
derived from rainfall, and become temporarily stabilised by vegetation to the point
that they can sustain human habitation. Seldommore than a metre or two above sea-
level, all atolls and related sand-cay islands are at the continuing mercy of the same
wind, waves, tides and weather events that built them. They are dynamic features of
the seascape, and over timescales of decades to centuries they erode here, grow there,
and sometimes disappear beneath the waves forever. Thus a coral atoll is not so much
a ‘thing’ as it is a process, and they are obviously not good places in which to develop
major human population centres.
Because they are located so close to sea-level, it is commonly assumed that atolls
are vulnerable to rising sea-level. However, investigations into the processes that gov-
ern their formation, evolution and stability indicate that they are very resilient to sea-
level changes, provided human activities do not disrupt the natural processes. Perhaps
counterintuitively, overwashing of the islands – by storm waves, storm surges, high
tides and tsunami – is an important mechanism for increasing their elevation, deposit-
ing new layers of sediment each time (Kench et al. 2006).
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Webb and Kench (2010) recently showed that 23 out of the 27 Pacific atolls that
they studied remained unchanged or increased in area during the last part of the 20th
century. Moreover, for most Pacific coral islands the rate of long-term sea-level rise
is less than the current global average rate; and no data exists that demonstrates an
increasing, unusual or unnatural rate of sea-level change for Pacific atolls.
Conclusion
The dynamic nature of an atoll is exacerbated, and its integrity jeopardized, when
it is subjected to the environmental pressures created by a growing human popula-
tion. Sandmining, construction project loading, and rapid groundwater withdrawal all
cause local lowering of the ground surface, and thereby encourage marine incursion
quite irrespective of any sea-level change. It is these processes in combination with
episodic natural hazards like tides and storms, and not global sea-level change, which
provide the alarming footage ofmarine flooding that from time to time appears on our
television news screens.
The hazards of coastal living
The fear about rising sea-levels swampingcoastal properties, or even swallowingwhole
Pacific atolls, has been generated by two factors. The first is the misidentification of
what causes coastal flooding today, and the second is theuseof rudimentary computer
models that project unrealistic estimates of future temperature and sea-level rise.
Modern coastal flooding is driven by the occurrence of rare natural events, most
notably high spring tides, heavy rainfall over the interior and large storm surges, each
of which can add a transitory metre or so to local sea-level height, or even 2–3 m if
combined – a height which can then be doubled for the storm surge associated with a
very large hurricane. Over the last 100 years, the majority of locations (though not all)
around the world’s coastlines have experienced a sea-level change of between about
−50 cm and +50 cm. This amount is too small to have effected noticeable changes in
shorelines that are subject to daily and seasonal variations in weather and sediment
supply. When, from time to time, beach erosion, river outlet clogging or cliff fall has
made the media headlines, mostly the cause has been a storm event, or natural or hu-
man interference with the flow of sediment: sea-level changes that might have oc-
curred over previous decades are rarely identifiable as a significant hazard contributor,
although of course they may have slightly enhanced or diminished the precise level
reached by a flood peak.
Conclusion
In essence, and even when considered in the context of the flooding and erosion risks
already inherent in coastal locations, the likely local sea-level change over the next 100
years is in most places too small to require a major planning response. Moreover, it
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is generally the occurrence of other events in conjunction with sea-level rise that cre-
ates the hazard, indicating thatmitigating or avoiding the associated events is a better
management approach. However, if the time horizon considered is expanded to the
geological scale of, say, 1000 years hence, then allowance will need to be made for
changes of between about −5.0 metres and +5.0 metres by AD 3010. It is, perhaps, a
little early yet tobe spendingmoneyondealingwith that distant, still small andanyway
hypothetical problem.
3 Measuring sea level
Over millennia andmore – geological evidence
Changes in sea-level over long periods of time (up to millions of years) are inferred
from geological evidence. A global sea-level curve for the period since the last ice age
is shown in Figure 3. It shows very rapid melting, at rates up to 26 mm/y for short
periods, between about 15,000 and 8,000 years ago, after which the rate of rise lessens
to 1–2 mm/y.
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Figure 3: Reconstructed global sea-level since the last glacial maximum, 20,000 years
ago, based on datedworldwide coral and peat deposits (after Fairbanks, 1989; Toscano
and McIntyre, 2003).
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Themaximumrates of rise occurred in short bursts, referred to asmelt-water pulses,
that may be caused by breakout floods from large northern hemisphere pro-glacial
lakes. No such large meltwater lakes exist today, so such high rates of rise are unlikely
to be repeated at this point in the Holocene melt cycle.
So although initially rapid during early post-glacial melting, thereafter sea-level
rises associated with past warmings appear to have quickly slowed (PALSEA, 2010).
Over the last 100 years – tide-gaugemeasurements
Local relative sea-level has traditionally been measured at ports using tide-gauges,
some of which have records that extend back to the 18th century. These measure-
ments tell us about the change that is occurring in actual sea-level at particular coastal
locations, which includes rises in some places and falls at others. After correction for
any site-specific tectonic or oceanographic-meteorologic distortions of the underlying
local sea-level signal, a number of geographically dispersed tide-gauge records can be
averaged to provide an estimate of the global (eustatic) sea-level curve.
Figure 4: Long, northern hemisphere tide-gauge records of sea-level change, 1700–
2000. After Hadley Centre and IPCC, TAR.
The longer term tide-gaugedata, after correction for subsidence, record a 20th cen-
tury sea-level rise of +1–2mm/y (see Figure 4). Based on these records, IPCC (2001) es-
timated an average global rate of rise between 1900 and 2000 of 1.6 mm/y. However,
the calculations are highly sensitive to the start and endpoints selected for the data set
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being considered, and the derived average also ignores short-term and multi-decadal
changes in sea-level known to be associated with meteorological and oceanographic
oscillations. Using different time periods, low rates of 0.5–1.2 mm/y over historic or
late Holocene time have been reported by several other authors (viz. Gehrels & Wood-
worth, 2013; Miller et al., 2009; Morner, 2004, 2012).
Over the last 20 years – satellite measurements
Estimates of sea-level change made using satellite-collected data for the moment re-
main problematic, because of the many uncertainties that exist with their collection
and processing. In particular, there is inconsistency between the results derived by dif-
ferent research groups, all of which anyway depend upon the accuracy of complex ad-
justments, some of which both increase the apparent rate of rise and lack independent
verification (Houston and Dean, 2012).
Onewidely used summaryof processed satellitemeasurements of sea-level change
is provided in Figure 5. This record indicates an average rate of rise between 1993
and 2010 of 2.9 mm/y. This is notably discrepant with the tide-gauge record over the
same and earlier periods. However, recent recalculations of a slightly longer dataset by
Cazenave et al. (2014) suggest that a 30% decline (from 3.5 mm/y to 2.4 mm/y) in the
rate of satellite-measured sea-level rise has occurred since 2002.
Conclusion
As concluded by Wunsch et al. (2007) with respect to the satellite measurements:
At best, the determination and attribution of global-mean sea-level change lies at
the very edge of knowledge and technology. . .Both systematic and randomerrors
are of concern, the former particularly, because of the changes in technology and
sampling methods over the many decades, the latter from the very great spatial
and temporal variability. . . It remains possible that the database is insufficient to
computemean sea-level trendswith the accuracy necessary to discuss the impact
of global warming – as disappointing as this conclusion may be. The priority has
to be to make such calculations possible in the future.
Is the rate of global sea-level rise accelerating?
The important question is not ‘is the long-term rate of sea-level rising’, for the geologi-
cal, tide-gauge and satellite record all agree that it is and, other things being equal, will
continue to do so. Rather, to provide evidence for increased rates of rise due to human
influence necessitates that the question be ‘is the rate of sea-level rise accelerating?’.
The answer is ‘no’.
For example, in its Third Assessment Report the IPCC (2001) wrote ‘no significant
acceleration in the rate of sea-level rise during the 20th century has been detected’. In
2007 they said that:
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Figure 5: NOAA satellite altimetry, global sea-level change since 1992. Dataset com-
posite, collected from successive satellites (coded in colour), and plotted monthly
without seasonal corrections. http://www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/sod/lsa/SeaLevelRise/
/LSA_SLR_timeseries.php.
. . .global average sea-level rose at an average rate of 1.8 [1.3–2.3]mmper year over
1961 to 2003. The ratewas faster over 1993–2003: about 3.1 [2.4–3.8]mmper year.
Whether the faster rate for 1993 to 2003 reflects decadal variability or an increase
in the longer-term trend is unclear.
This latter interpretation was based on a comparison of satellite altimetry data (the
recording of which only started in 1991) and tide-gauge data, and is therefore repre-
sents an ‘apples-to-oranges’ comparison. That the satellite data produce a higher rate
of sea-level rise than do the tide-gauge data (Wunsch et al. 2007) does not provide
evidence of acceleration.
Subsequently, many authors have directly tested the proposition of acceleration in
sea-level rise for regional datasets. Watson (2011) analysed the three longest sea-level
records for Australasia, and found deceleration over the later parts of the 20th century
and into the 21st (i.e. a slowing of the rate of rise). Other authors who have provided
evidence for a slowing rate of sea-level rise during the late 20th and 21st centuries
include Hannah (1990; 2004), Hannah and Bell (2012), Holgate (2007), Houston and
Dean (2011, 2012), Boretti (2012a,b), Gehrels et al. (2012), Houston (2013), Chen et al.
(2014) and Cazenave et al. (2014).
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Church andWhite (2006, 2011) suggested that the long-term sea-level rise acceler-
ated during the late 20th century. Because their work is based onmerged satellite and
tide-gauge datasets, these studies are problematic and have to be used with caution.
Break point and other statistical analyses indicate a significant change in the under-
lying characteristics of the data around 1992 (Chambers et al. 2012), i.e. at the com-
mencement of satellite measurements. This implies either that a fundamental change
in sea-level processes occurred in 1992, or that the satellite data behave differently to
the tide-gauge data – the latter view being supported by Wunsch et al. (2007) and
Domingues et al. (2008). But in any case, linear trends calculated over periods as short
as 20–30 years (as the satellite data are) cannot be viewed as reliable indicators of the
long-term rate of sea-level change.
There is, however, general agreement that sea-level rise began to accelerate in or
before the 19th century (e.g. Jevrejeva et al. 2008), despite the paucity of tide-gauge
records that extend back beyond that. Woodworth et al. (2009) reviewed the avail-
able reconstructions for the 20th century and concluded that sea-level rise accelerated
around 1920–1930 and decelerated around 1960.
The presence of both decadal and 60-year-long fluctuations in rates of sea-level
change like these (Holgate, 2007; Church and White 2011) indicates that it is too soon
to attempt to identify any late 20th century acceleration based upon satellite altimetric
measurements.
Conclusion
Although it is possible to demonstrate with a high degree of confidence that global
sea-level is currently rising at a decelerating rate, the concept of ameasured global rate
of sea-level rise that has widespread significance is untenable. Spatial and temporal
fluctuations at several scales make it difficult to relate observed sea-level at any one
location with a global trend in sea-level change.
4 Projections of sea-level change
Graphs that project future sea-level can be constructed in three different ways.
Empirical prediction
The first method, empirical projection, has already been discussed incidentally in Sec-
tion 3. This method involves extrapolation of current trends to project future sea-level
positions; importantly, this method provides rigorous estimates of the uncertainty of
the projections made.
Ingeneral, for empirical prediction theextrapolation cannot extendvery far beyond
the limits of the original data (say 10%) before the confidence limits diverge widely.
Therefore, empirical models cannot usefully predict sea-level very far into the future.
Nonetheless, a good quality 100-year-long tide-gauge record should provide predic-
tions 20 years into the future with reasonable confidence limits. This should be suffi-
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cient to manage coastal development with a short design life, and is also a good basis
on which to develop longer term adaptive and mitigation strategies.
IPCC deterministic modelling
The second method, at the other extreme to empirical modelling in terms of compu-
tational complexity, involves computer simulations, often referred to as GCMs (general
circulation models). Starting from scenarios of future economic activity, these models
use the laws of physics to estimate changes in temperature, the response of the oceans
and the cryosphere, and hence changes in sea-level. Such modelling proceeds on the
assumption that all relevant factors are known and taken into account, and that ad-
equate theoretical understanding exists and can be expressed mathematically; these
assumptions are not necessarily true, and GCMmodels have not been able to recreate
past sea-levels well.
The range of possible future sea-level changes has progressively decreased since
the earliest reports produced for the UN (Hoffman et al. 1983). In its Third Assessment
Report in 2001, the IPCC provided a range of computer-generated projections for sea-
level riseby2100ofbetween11cmand77cm. Subsequently, in theFourthAssessment
Report in 2007, andusing similarmodelling, the IPCCadjusted theprojected rise of sea-
level in 2100 to liewithin the bounds 18–59 cm. It is noteworthy that the bottomendof
this range corresponds with the 18-cm rise in sea-level that results from extrapolating
the long-term tide-gauge rate of rise of 1.8 mm/y out to 2100.
Semi-empirical models
The published results from semi-empirical models produce the highest and the most
alarming estimates of rates of future sea-level change so far published (between 80 cm
and 180 cm by 2100), and conflict with projections based upon empirical or determin-
istic modelling. Accordingly, they are controversial and have attracted substantial sci-
entific criticism (Holgate et al. 2007; Schmith et al., 2007; Rahmstorf, 2007). The contro-
versy surrounding thesemodels remains unresolved. Given their scientific uncertainty,
and given that both empirical and GCM modelling yield more modest projections of
future sea-level, the semi-empirical models can at best only be viewed as a work in
progress.
As Gregory et al. (2012) have pointed out, semi-empirical methods for projecting
sea-level dependupon there being an established relationship betweenglobal climate
change and the rate of global sea-level change, and such a relationship is weak or ab-
sent during the 20th century.
Conclusions
Many complicating factors and uncertainties underlie any projected estimate of future
global sea-level change. Of the three types of modelling that can be used to make
such estimates (empirical, semi-empirical and deterministic), empirical models yield
the most useful result. This is because empirical projections are rooted in site-specific
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measurements that establish real-world trends and can be used for practical coastal
management and planning.
5 How is sea-level likely to change around the world
in the near future?
The one certainty is that future sea-level will continue to change at differing rates and
in different directions at locations around the world, as it always has in the past. Two
different procedures are involved with assessing these future sea-level changes. They
are, first, an understanding of past and present environmental conditions and rates of
change; and, second, a theoretical analysis and projection of likely changes to environ-
mental conditions and rates of change.
Past environmental conditions and rates of change
Moderncoastlines result primarily fromsea-level changeat theglacial–interglacial level,
as it occurred over thousands and tens of thousands of years (Figure 3). We have ex-
plained the dynamic nature of the processes that cause shoreline change and migra-
tion (see Section 2) and noted that one, but only one, of the determinants of that
coastal change is sea-level; other factors, such as the overall sediment budget, may
be more important at specific times or localities. In Section 3, we showed that world-
wide the rate of sea-level change is locality specific, and encompasses placeswhere the
contemporary level is falling and others where it is rising. In addition, the rate of sea-
level change constantly varies through time. Consequently, changes in both relative
sea-level and coastal geography are commonplace along the shorelines of the world,
and have been observed by mankind for many centuries.
Another important factor requiring consideration is the variable time lags that ac-
company changes in global temperature, ice melt, runoff and sea-level response. This
may vary from a year or two for the expected direct thermosteric response to heating
of the shallow ocean,4 to hundreds of years for ice melt and runoff processes, and to
more than a thousand years if deep-ocean circulation of heat is taken into account. In
other words, the cause–effect relationship between global temperature and sea-level
change is far frombeing as simple as is customarily assumed. This is highlighted for the
historical record by the review of Gregory et al. (2012) who found that the relationship
between global climate change and global mean sea-level rise was ‘weak or absent
during the twentieth century’.
Conclusion
The first key to projecting future change is to document and understand all the envi-
ronmental variables that apply to any shoreline location of interest – including, though
not exclusively, its historic pattern of sea-level change.
4The term thermosteric refers to the effect of direct heating on the oceanwater body, which causes it to expand and
thus sea-level to rise concomitantly.
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Future environmental conditions and rates of change
In late 2012, the UK Met Office caused minor sensations by acknowledging that no
global warming had occurred since 1997, i.e. for the previous 16 years, and predicting
that the lack of warmingwould continue into the future (Whitehouse, 2013). Although
thiswas simply thepublic disseminationof a reality that hadbeenacknowledged in the
scientific literature several years earlier (e.g., Keenlyside et al., 2008), it flew directly in
the faceof continuing advice from the IPCCas to thenecessity of preventingdangerous
global warming.
It is now generally acknowledged amongst scientists that the mild Late 20th Cen-
turyWarmingepisodehasbeen supersededbyatmospheric temperature stasis or even
slight decline. The cause of this change is generally believed to relate to changes in the
behaviour of the important Pacific decadal and Atlantic multi-decadal climatic oscil-
lations. Since 2003, ocean temperatures have also been cooling slightly (Lyman et al.,
2006;Willis et al., 2007; 2008). Indeed, Harrison andCarson (2007), studyingocean tem-
perature change between 1950 and 2000, suggested that the oceans may have been
cooling since the late 1970s.
These conclusions immediately cast doubt on the current claims by the IPCC (2007)
that extra heat has accumulated in the oceans since 1960, and that sea-level rise driven
by thermal expansion of the water will be the inevitable result. In fact, analyses of
global sea-level budgets over the last decade attribute around twice as much of the
recent rise to meltwater contributions (caused by atmospheric warming) as they do to
thermal expansion (e.g., Leuliette and Willis, 2011).
Regarding the projection of future sea-level and shoreline change, we therefore
arrive at an impasse. The IPCC and its scientific advisers remain committed to the view
that global warming, albeit temporarily suspended, will resume and that sea-levels will
rise. Other equally qualified but independent scientists, including a number of solar
astrophysicists (viz. Bonev et al. 2004), are of the view that over the next few decades
cooling is more likely than warming. Meanwhile, real-world climate is exhibiting an
increasingly long stasis, with temperature trends well below the IPCC projected mean
rate of 0.2–0.3◦C per decade.
Conclusion
The reality is that no scientist can tell you, with credible probability attached, whether
2030, 2050 or 2100 will be cooler or warmer than today, and hence whether global (or
individual local) sea-level changeswill accelerate, continue at a steady rate, decelerate,
or even reverse. It would therefore be prudentmanagement to prepare to adapt to any
and all of these alternative futures.
The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report: what’s new on sea-level?
The Summary for Policymakers (SPM) of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (5AR), re-
leased in September 2013, treats sea-level change in the same unsatisfactory fashion
as did the predecessor Third and Fourth reports. The focus of attention is again on
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deterministic computer model projections of future global mean sea-level, whilst the
practical advice needed formanaging coastal hazard, which requires close attention to
tide-gauge measurements that record the variability of local relative sea level change,
is ignored apart from the following statement (p. SPM-19):
Sea level rise will not be uniform. By the end of the 21st century, it is very likely
that sea level will rise inmore than about 95%of the ocean area. About 70%of the
coastlines worldwide are projected to experience sea level change within 20% of
the global mean sea level change.
The key phrase here is ‘. . .of the ocean area’. IPCC’s modelling of global mean sea-
level changedoesnot take intoaccount themanyandvaried local and regional changes
in coastal basement level that occur around continental and island margins, caused
by processes like glacial rebound, thermal decay, hydro-istostasy and tectonic activity.
These models, and the IPCC in general, therefore provide no guidance that is of practi-
cal value to those who are responsible for coastal management.
About its model projections, IPCC asserts (p. SPM-18):
Confidence in projections of globalmean sea level rise has increased since theAR4
because of the improved understanding of the components of sea level, the im-
proved agreement of process-based models with observations, and the inclusion
of ice-sheet dynamical changes.
The projections contained in AR5 assume an ‘increased ocean warming and increased
loss ofmass fromglaciers and ice sheets’ which is not currently occurring. This notwith-
standing, and relative to the years 1986–2005, the IPCC now projects rises in global
mean sea-level by 2081–2100 for different socio-economic scenarios as shown in Ta-
ble 1.
Table 1: IPCC projections of sea-level rise
Scenario Minimum rise Maximum rise Mid-point rise
cm cm cm
SRES A1B 36 59 47
RCP2.6 26 55 40
RCP4.5 32 63 47
RCP6.0 33 63 48
RCP8.5 45 82 63
Note that scenario RCP8.5 is the most extreme (i.e. has the strongest greenhouse
gas forcing) of the four scenarios examined, and sets the total greenhouse gas forc-
ing at 8.5 W/m2, or the equivalent of a 1313 ppm CO2 concentration by the year 2100.
The rapid rates of sea level rise projected for RCP8.5 therefore do not result under the
other three scenarios considered. It is noteworthy that the ‘consensus’ 40–50-cm rise
by 2100 that is projected by the three less extreme scenarios, while very similar to the
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projections B1, B2 and A1T scenarios in the 4th Assessment Report, is still high com-
pared to the 18-cm rise indicated by naïve projection of measured 20th century rates
of sea-level change.
All the RCP scenarios assume an initial rate of sea level rise between 2007–2013 of
3.7 mm/y, followed by different rates of acceleration. This startling rate of sea level rise
is higher than currently observed by either satellite altimetry or tide gauges. At the
same time, a 40–50-cm rise is also one third or less of the extreme changes projected
by semi-empirical modelling (e.g., Rahmstorf, 2007) or by Gore (2006). The AR5 report
notes that there is no consensus about the reliability of semi-empirical models and
assigns low confidence to their projections.
Based on the AR5 projections, and across the different scenarios, ocean thermal ex-
pansion accounts for 30-55%ofmodelled sea-level rise and icemelt for 15–35%. These
figures differ little from those asserted in earlier reports. For example, AR4 estimated
that ~0.4 mm (22%) of the 1.8-mm average annual sea-level rise was accounted for by
thermal expansion, that ice-melt accounted for ~0.7 mm/y (39%) and that the remain-
ing 0.7 mm/y (39%) probably related to dynamic oceanographic and meteorological
factors. In the warming world that IPCC assumes, however, increased snowfall is prob-
able in the interior of both Greenland and Antarctica. Taking this into account, IPCC
now estimates that the likely amount of sea-level rise due to ice melt by 2100 will be
just 3–20 cm.
In essence, IPCC’s Fifth and Fourth Assessment Reports AR5 report differ little in
their conclusions about future sea-levels. The unknowns are the same (future emission
levels; future temperature; future mass balance changes in Antarctica and Greenland;
ocean dynamics), the projections are still highly qualified, the probabilities of occur-
rence are ignored and the range of sea level projections remains essentially the same.
Conclusion
Policymakers concerned about the effects of sea-level change on coastal infrastructure
will be better served by taking advice from competent coastal engineers (see Thames
Estuary 2001 Plan, 7 below) than they will by attempting to apply the IPCC’s uncertain
projections of global sea-level.
6 What then is the problem?
Based on geological studies, it appears that slow global sea-level rise has been taking
place over about the last 10,000 y (Figure 3). It is established bymany studies, too, that
over the last 150 years global sea-level has been rising at an average rate of about 1-
2 mm/y, which represents the slow continuation of post-glacial ice melting. At specific
localities, this rising global trend interacts with tectonic factors, glacial rebound and
multi-decadal rhythmicity to produce patterns of local relative sea-level change that
vary from place to place and region to region.
If they continue to melt, glaciers and ice caps are expected to contribute another
12±4 cm to sea-levels by 2100 by Church et al. (2011) and 3–20 cm by IPCC (AR5).
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These projected ice sheet contributions remain uncertain because of large variations
in estimates of ice volume losses, but an upper limit based on extrapolating a short
record is 56 cm of extra sea-level rise by 2100 (Pfeffer, 2011).
There is, therefore, no scientific basis for Mr. Al Gore’s claim (Gore, 2006) that global
warming will imminently melt so much ice that sea-levels will rise by as much as 20 ft.
Conclusion
The problem is not global sea-level change (which, using a naïve forecasting ap-
proach,5 is likely to rise by 18 cm or less by 2100). Rather it is uncertainty. That un-
certainty applies to future global temperature, future rates of icemass-balance change,
future global sea-level change and future socio-economic scenarios; and it is profound.
7 An example of practical policy in action: the Thames
Estuary 2100 plan
The Thames Estuary coast is threatened by marine inundation which has the poten-
tial to negatively affect 1.25 million residents and infrastructure valued at £200 billion
(Environment Agency, 2012). The region is presently protected from flooding by a sys-
temof embankments and floodgates, including the Thames Barrier completed in 1982.
This system ispart of ~1200kmof coastal defenses in EnglandandWales, which in com-
bination protect about a third of the coastline (de la Vega-Leinert and Nicholls, 2008).
Sea-level rise is a factor that has been identified as needing to be considered in relation
to coastal protection (French, 1997).
For the purpose of assessing sea-level rise and its potential impacts, the coast of
the United Kingdom can be subdivided into distinct regions, or coastal cells. Based
on the exchange of sediment along the coast, 14 coastal cells separated by barriers to
sediment transport are recognized and form the basis for current coastal management
(French, 1997). De la Vega-Leinert and Nicholls (2008) argue that due to changes in the
coastal types present, the cells also reflect vulnerability to coastal erosion and flooding,
and hence sea-level rise. Comparing the sea-level trends around the United Kingdom
(Woodworth et al., 1999; Shennan and Horton, 2002) with the coastal cells indicates
that they are undergoing differing relative land movements, primarily in response to
isostatic adjustments since the last glaciation, the result of which is higher rates of rel-
ative sea-level rise in the south. Hence, the southeast coast, including the Thames Es-
tuary and London, is vulnerable to sea-level rise (de la Vega-Leinert and Nicholls, 2008;
Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013).
Stormsurges and river floods represent a further climate-relatedhazard that is asso-
ciatedwith sea-level rise, because for anygivenmagnitudeof stormsurgeor river flood,
a higher background sea-level will result in a higher level of inundation. However, the
level of inundation is also a function of tidal elevation and timing of the surge or flood
peak relative tohighwater, so stormandfloodhazards are also linked to tidal character-
istics. As sea-levels change, the propagation of tidal waves and storm surges change,
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particularly on the North Sea coast, which alters both the mean sea-level and extreme
sea-level distributions (Hinton, 1995; Shennan and Horton, 2002). Further, the magni-
tude and frequency distributions of storm surges and floods may change in response
to climate (de la Vega-Leinert and Nichols), particularly if the trajectories of storm sys-
tems change. Hence, the impact of climate and relative sea-level changes on coastal
hazards is complex and strongly site specific.
The TE2100 project assessed the vulnerability of the City of London to storm surge
and flood impacts associated with relative sea-level rise, and claims to be the first ma-
jor flood risk assessment for the United Kingdom to place climate change adaptation
at its core (Environment Agency, 2012; Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013). Although, the
project based sea-level projections on global estimates (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013),
it considered site-specific factors such as an average 7m tidal range, subsidence due to
consolidation of sediments of 1.5 mm/y, and forecast changes to storm surge magni-
tude and frequency (Environment Agency, 2012). Their analysis found that the higher
projections of sea-level rise were highly unlikely, and that storm surge frequency and
magnitudewere likely to decrease. This led to a downward revision ofmaximumwater
levels (storm surge + tide + sea-level rise) for 2100 from +4.2 to +2.7 m (Environment
Agency, 2012).
The TE2100 project also investigated a range of adaptation options to mitigate the
identified climate change impacts. This involved both a cost-benefit analysis and a
multi-criteria analysis to evaluate 5 flood risk management policies and 9 protection
options (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013). These analyses concluded that London and the
Thames Estuary should continue to beprotected, but that the existing coastal defenses
would provide the necessary level of protection until at least 2070. Further, improving
the coastal defenses now is not justified by the cost-benefit analysis, and the most im-
portant factor driving this analysis appears to be socio-economic factors and not cli-
mate (except for the most extreme projected climate scenarios). Finally, the TE2100
project demonstrated that the rate of risk increase is sufficiently slow that there is time
to plan and maintain existing coastal defenses incrementally, rather than front-load
the response based on long-term projections (Environment Agency, 2012; Penning-
Rowsell et al., 2013).
Conclusion
Crucially for its success, the Thames Estuary 2100 Plan was implemented in an adap-
tive rather than a preventative (‘stop global sea-level rise’) way. Likely future coastal
changes around the estuary were examined within a framework of hard, factual mea-
surements of the local environment, and the computermodelling involvedwas rooted
in these measurements rather than in speculative global averages. This type of plan
represents an excellent template for application, in conjunction with the particular lo-
cal circumstances, at other places around the world.
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8 What is the best policy outcome?
Two key issues are important for making decisions about sea-level and coastal man-
agement policy.
Certainty or uncertainty?
The first is certainty, as just discussed. Can we or can we not predict with a specified
probability what rates of sea-level change (note ‘change’, not ‘rise’) will occur over the
next 100 years, either globally or in specific localities?
The answer to both questions is ‘no’. For global sea-level change, an empirical ap-
proach of extrapolating the 20th century rate suggests a rise of 18 cm by 2100. For
local relative sea-level change, assumed to be the principal driver of coastal impacts
(Nicholls, 2011), convolving this assumed 18-cm rise with knowledge of the other en-
vironmental factors that characterise different locations (including tectonics) will pro-
vide many and varied estimates of the rise or fall of sea-level by 2100, most of which
will range between about± 1-2mm/y. But in none of these cases can ameaningful sta-
tistical probability be assigned to the accuracy of the projection for either the global or
for the many different local sea-level curves.
The precautionary principle
The existence of strong uncertainty is often used to advance the dangerously false ar-
gument that, because the science is uncertain,we should takeaction to curtail sea-level
rise ‘just in case’.
Most often this argument is badged under the term precautionary principle. First
formulated at a United Nations environment conference in Rio de Janiero in 1992, this
states that: ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full sci-
entific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation.’ An influential and colloquial restatement of
the ‘principle’ is that in case of possible hazard to the planet we should ‘give Earth the
benefit of the doubt’.
Ironically, invocation of the precautionary principle into an argument in the first
place is an open acknowledgement that no compelling scientific evidence for alarm
exists. Second, rarely if ever is a rigorous analysis undertaken of the costs and bene-
fits of precautionary action as opposed to inaction. British philosopher MaxMoore has
recently argued that a better way of handling environmental risk is to apply a proac-
tionary principle (Moore, 2013). Recognising that stagnation is not a realistic option
for a world community that wishes to continue to raise living standards for the many,
proactionary policies stand for the proactive pursuit of progress in away that improves
our world (including through technological solutions) and handles deleterious effects
through compensation and remediation.
Wefindourselves in agreementwith bothMoore and theUnitedKingdomHouseof
Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology (2006) that the precautionary
principle is inappropriate for use in the formulation of effective public environmental
policy – which must instead be rooted in evidence-based science. Scientific principles
30
Sea-level Change
acknowledge the supremacy of experiment and observation and do not bow to in-
stinctive feelings of alarm nor to untestable moral propositions.
It is the simplest of logic that if we don’t know in advance the direction and rate of
sea-level change, either globally or locally, then we cannot take precautions to try to
mitigate or prevent change. It is obvious that in such circumstances different coastal
management policies will be necessary in different places depending upon whether
local sea-level is either stable, rising or falling.
Conclusion
At its simplest, the precautionary principle cannot be applied in anymeaningful global
sense if all that we know is that sea-level will rise in some locations and remain stable
or fall in others.
Cost–benefit analysis
The second key issue is making judgments about the cost-effectiveness of any sug-
gestedpolicies, i.e. the undertaking of cost–benefit analyses, which are needed at both
global and local level.
Local–regional: traditional coastal policy formulation
In most countries, coastal management is traditionally undertaken by a local or re-
gional council of some type, operating within a legal framework that is provided by
either a state or national parliament (French, 1997). Matters that are dealt with include
beach erosion, harbour dredging, and planning and building regulations about what
types of structuresmay be built, andwhere. In implementing coastal policy, councilors
and their staff have traditionally been guidedby experienced, legally accountable, pro-
fessional coastal engineers and scientists.
Because such management is always predicated on knowledge of local environ-
mental factors, which differ from place to place, it differs in detail amongst themyriads
of coastal councils and planning authorities that exist worldwide. However, in demo-
cratic countries at least, management procedures and decisions proceed within the
framework of the more or less rigorous cost–benefit analysis that is provided by reg-
ular council elections: nothing concentrates the mind so wonderfully towards sensi-
ble and cost-effective solutions as the knowledge that one’s job will be terminated by
ratepayers should signsofpolicy silliness, financial self-interest orbudget extravagance
become apparent.
Continuing and effective cost–benefit analysis of coastal policy was therefore un-
til recently generally alive and well at the local and regional level of governance and
administration.
Global: post-1988 policy formulation
Things are different, however, at the global level: the natural variability of coastal en-
vironments and rates of local sea-level change, and the complexity of the various dy-
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namic processes involved in shaping a coastline, make it impossible to undertake any
meaningful overall cost–benefit analysis of policies designed to influence future sea-
level changeonaworldwidebasis. Not surprisingly therefore, at least so far asweknow,
no-onehas attempted toundertake a cost–benefit analysis of thedifferent policies that
might be applied to coastal management with respect to the issue of global sea-level
alarm. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how one could meaningfully even approach such
a task.
Nevertheless, in 1988 an international agency – the IPCC – was charged with ad-
vising governments about global sea-level change through the relationship that exists
between sea-level andglobal temperature. Theadventof IPCC’sglobalwarmingadvice
short-circuited the traditional policy process, wherebygovernments and councils drew
their advice about sea-level change from statutory authorities concernedwith harbour
and tidal management, and from formal governmental scientific agencies. With this
change in advisors, the attention of governments shifted from seeing sea-level change
as an issue related to beaches, ports, harbours and navigation to seeing it as an envi-
ronmental issue that was related to hypothetical global warming putatively caused by
human carbon dioxide emissions. At about the same time, the basis of public policy on
sea-level shifted from tide-gauges to satellite measurements.
By the turn of the 20th century, governments around the world, and their advisory
scientists, were basing their sea-level planning almost exclusively on the advice of the
IPCC, i.e. on unvalidated hypothetical computer model predictions that are not tied to
local sea-level measurements, but to a theoretical model of the shape of the earth (the
geoid) that floats in mathematical space.
Because IPCC sea-level predictions were and are for a global average sea-level, we
have arrived at our present unsustainable position, which is one of governments fash-
ioning policy and new laws on the basis of a notional statistic, and in almost complete
disregard of the local real, and in general accurate, measurements that are available
from tide-gauge networks.
For the purposes of the argument, let us accept the IPCC’s estimate that 0.7 mm/y
of the current rate of global sea-level rise is ice melt and 0.4 mm/y is due to thermal
expansion. Let us calculate out to 2100 and, noting that no thermal expansion is oc-
curring at the moment because ocean temperatures are not rising, assume that ther-
mal expansion will recommence at the IPCC’s estimated rate in 2050. Calculation then
shows that there would be a 6-cm rise in sea-level by 2100, i.e. one third of the 18-cm
rise known for the 20th century. No actual shoreline changes can be attributed specif-
ically to the small 20th century rise in global sea-level, for the very good reason that an
18-cm change lies well within the range of natural variations in local relative sea-level;
and this condition would be even more true for a rise as small as 6 cm. Given that the
cost of implementing measures to cut carbon dioxide emissions by even 20% would
run into trillions of dollars (Leahy, 2012), and that they might reduce our anticipated
sea-level rise from 6 cm to 4.8 cm, it is beyond heroic to argue that such a course of
action is either sensible or cost effective.
In this context, it must be remembered that in many countries recent legislation or
regulation requires coastal authorities to base their planning on the IPCC’s previously
assumed 59-cm rise by 2100, or higher; for example, the Australian states of Victoria
and New SouthWales have set planning benchmark levels of 80 cm and 90 cm, respec-
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tively.
The result of shifting from the traditional empirical methods and adopting (and
sometimes embellishing) the IPCC’s uncertain model-based sea-level projections has
been the introduction of much additional unrecognized uncertainty into coastal man-
agement policy. First, because of the uncertainty of the global temperature projections
that feed into sea-level modelling and second because of the lack of certainty also of
the relationship betweenglobal temperature change and land-basedpolar icemelting
rates.
Conclusion
Current global sea-level policy, supported by many governments, is to reduce the
amountof carbondioxide in theatmosphere inorder to slowa theoretical globalwarm-
ing that is apparently no longer happening. The intention is to reduce the heat expan-
sion of the ocean and the amount of ice-melt, and thereby to reduce the rate of global
sea-level rise.
These policies attempt tomoderate a theoretical environmental variable, ignore lo-
cal sea-level realities, are ineffectual in significantly reducing sea-level rise and are not
remotely cost effective. The policies are therefore financially and politically unsustain-
able.
9 Recommended policy guidelines
Based on the material presented in this paper, we recommend the implementation of
three policy guidelines.
1. Abandonment of ‘let’s stop global sea-level rise’ policies
No justification exists for continuing to base sea-level policy and coastal management
regulation upon the outcomes of deterministic or semi-empirical sea-level modelling.
Such modelling remains speculative rather than predictive.
The practice of using a global rate of sea-level change to manage specific coastal
locations worldwide is irrational, and should be abandoned.
2. Recognition of the local or regional nature of coastal hazard
Most coastal hazard is intrinsically local in nature. Other than periodic tsunami and
exceptional storms, it is the regular and repetitive local processes of wind, waves, tides
and sediment supply that fashion the location and shape of the shorelines of theworld.
Local relative sea-level is an important determinant too, but in some localities that is
rising and in others falling. Accordingly, there is no ‘one size fits all’ sea-level curve or
policy that can be applied.
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Coastal hazard needs to be managed in the context of regional and local knowl-
edge, using data gathered by site-specific tide-gauges and other relevant instrumen-
tation.
3. Use of planning controls that are flexible and adaptive in nature
The shoreline naturally moves around over time in response to changing environmen-
tal conditions. Many planning regulations already recognize this, for example by ap-
plyingminimumbuilding setback distances or heights from the tidemark. In addition,
engineering solutions (groynes, breakwaters, sea-defence walls) are often used in at-
tempts to stabilize a shoreline. To the degree that they are both effective and environ-
mentally acceptable, such solutions should be encouraged.
Nevertheless, occasional damage will continue to be imposed from time to time
by large storms or other unusual natural events. This will happen no matter how ex-
cellent the pre-existing coastal engineering and planning controls may be. In these
circumstances, the appropriate policy should be one of careful preparation for, and
adaptation to, hazardous events as and when they occur.
It is the height of folly, and waste of money, to attempt to ‘control’ the size or fre-
quency of damaging natural events by expecting that reductions in human carbon
dioxideemissionswillmoderate climate ‘favourably’, whether thatbeputatively sought
from a moderation in the frequency and intensity of damaging natural events or by a
reduction in the rate of global average sea-level rise.
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